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Augustine on Christian Justification of Violence

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Introduction

It has been the prevailing view at least within Christianity that St. Augustine of Hippo is the founder of the just war theory; however M. Walzer mentions Maimonides (1135-1204) in *catena aurea* instead of Augustine (Just and Unjust Wars, p.xx) . One of the reasons might be the vast references to authoritative works of Augustine among all the medieval theologians.

A modern standard for the justification of war can be summed up, neglecting minor variations, as follows:

(A) Jus ad bellum consists of (1) just cause, (2) competent authority and public declaration, (3) right intention, (4) limited objectives, (5) last resort, (6) reasonable hope of success;
(B) while Jus in bello consists of (7) discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, (8) micro-proportionality, (9) no means mala in se. (Cf. M. Nakagawa, p.179-181; M.R. Amstutz, p.101-102)

Of these items listed, the major points (1)(2)(3) had been clearly declared by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and then his successors, Cajetan (1469-1534), Vitoria (1480-1546), and Suarez (1548-1617), sophisticated with the revisions of minor conditions up to Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). (S.D. Bailey; J.T.Johnson, p.123)

According to Aquinas, in order for a war to be just, three things are necessary:

(1) the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war or to summon together the people in wartime. So he refers to Augustine's statement (*Contra Faustum*, 22.75, PL 42, 448): The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.

(2) Secondary, a just cause is also required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. Wherefore, Augustine says (*Quaest. in Heptat. Lib.6, q.10, super Iosue, PL34, 781*): A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly. (3)

Thirdly, the belligerents should have a rightful intention such as the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Aquinas quotes also from Augustine with a mistaken title (*De verbis domini*): True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evildoers, and of uplifting the good (cf. *De Civitate Dei*, 19.12, PL 41, 637). To the contrary, it may happen for war to be unlawful through a wicked intention. Augustine says (*Contra Faustum*, 22.74): The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpeaceful and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war.

The title of the article (S.Th. 2-2, q.40, a.1) is "Whether it is always sinful to wage war?" It is characteristic, as the title may indicate, that Aquinas treats the problem of war, not primarily from a general legal viewpoint of justice and injustice, but rather as a sin opposed to peace on the basis of divine love. Besides the main answer, in his own replies to three objections and *Sed Contra*, he quotes five times from Augustine's writings: *Contra Faustum*, 22.70, PL 42, 444; *Epist. ad Marcellinum*, 2, PL 33, 531; *De sermo domini in monte*, 1.19.58-59, PL 34, 1260; *Epist. ad Bonifacium*, 6, PL 33, 856. Only St. Jerome is mentioned besides Augustine in this principal article concerning the justification of war. As far as his referential sources are concerned, Aquinas seems to be totally dependent on the authority of Augustine, while neglecting the earlier Patristic tradition of pacifism: Tertullian (ca.160-ca.220), Origen (ca.185-ca.254), Lactantius (ca.240-ca.320).

It is inevitable for any naive reader of *Summa Theologiae* to regard Augustine as the primary source of Christian just war theory. However, I suspect that the "father of the theory" at the focal point may be an unreal image, although his extensive influence over the medieval political thought is indubitable. Augustine indeed sought to justify warfare in some respects. Did he, then, try to construct a coherent theory to justify the violence of nations? What is "just war theory"? Could his original thinking about war be regarded as such a theory in the modern sense?

1

The problem of the just war theory emerged primarily in the process of the militarization and secularization of Christianity following the accession of Constantine the Great (306 A.D.). Through most of the first four hundred years of Church history, there is no apparent mention of a just war theory, since the official Christian attitude had generally been pacifist. Up until 170-180 A.D., when some Christians served with Marcus Aurelius, there is no mention of any Christians in military service. Warfare was universally rejected by early Church, and all the outstanding writers, e.g. Tertullian, Origen, and Lactantius, were strongly opposed to any military service by Christians (Lenihan, p.40).

St. Ambrose of Milan (ca.339-397), an excellent bishop-politician, sees no problem with Christian participation in warfare. In extolling the virtue of fortitude he says: "Nor is the law of courage exercised in causing, but in driving away all harm. He who does not keep harm off a friend, if he can, is as much in fault as he who cause it. Wherefore holy Moses gave this as a first proof of his fortitude in war. For when he saw an Hebrew receiving hard treatment at the hands of an Egyptian, he defended him, and laid low the Egyptian and bit him in the sand" (*Duties of the Clergy*, 1.36.179). And he calls to the Emperor Gratian (375-383), who was about to go forth to help ward off the Goths in the Eastern Empire: "I must no further detain your Majesty, in this season of preparation for war, and the achievement of victory over the barbarians. Go forth, sheltered, indeed, under the shield of faith, and girt with the sword of the Spirit; go forth to the victory" (*Exposition of Christian Faith*, 2.16.136; both transl. from Ph. Schaff ed., *St. Ambrose: Select Works and Letters*, 1955).

R. Holmes rightly claims "the justification of war on the grounds of its necessity to defend the innocent has repeatedly been attributed to Augustine....But this line of justification is more properly attributed to Ambrose than to Augustine" (p.340, n.12). It is clearly on the ground both of Ciceronian political philosophy and of the episodes of military prowess in the Holy Scripture that Ambrose constructed his primitive version of the just war theory. Cicero, on the basis of his Stoic ethics, insists that there are certain duties that we owe even to the enemy who have wronged us: There is a limit to retribution and to punishment. An aggressor should be brought to repent of his wrong-doing, in order that he may not repeat the offence and that others may be deterred from doing wrong. He fused his idea of the just war, which has been so called since his day, with traditional Roman cult practices, such as the *fetiale* code, and displayed the honorable episodes of Roman military heroes, such as General Regulus (*De Officiis*, 1.11-12. transl. by W. Miller, Loeb Classical Library).

There have been two opposite views among early Christian thinkers concerning the role of the Roman Empire in Christian salvation history. A positive view is that of Origen of Alexandria who, being personally himself a pacifist and later martyred under persecution, saw

Divine favor in the success of the Roman state and thus accord to Rome an integral role in the salvation of the whole world (*Contra Celsum*, 2.30). Eusebius of Caesarea (260-ca.339), a biographer of Origen and eminent Church historian, felt this view was confirmed by the conversion of the Emperor Constantine and the resulting Christianization of the Empire. Major Latin Fathers of the 4th century, including Ambrose and Jerome (ca.347-419), share the view to see in the Pax Romana the design of Divine Providence.

Another view is negative, which sees in the Roman regime the apocalyptic beast described in the Book of Daniel, 7.19. The Roman Empire is, according to Hippolytus of Rome, a contemporary theologian with Origen, a "satanic imitation of the Kingdom of Christ" (Lavere, p.139). This was also the position of two Carthaginian Latin fathers, Cyprian (ca.200-258) and Tertullian, the martyrs of Africa and Italia in the 2nd and 3rd centuries, and generally those who had been persecuted by Roman authorities for their religious beliefs. The Christian life-style, according to them, must be other-worldly, and the divine commandments would stand above any secular laws and commands of the Emperor.

Augustine did set himself apart from both positions, in his rigid refusal to identify his ideal City of God with any visible person or institution, not even the Catholic Church or the Christian communities. He ironically says: "How great the number of believers gathered together; and those who are truly converted are the minority, those who are only in appearance are the majority" (*Enarrationes in Psalmos*, 39.10). Jaroslav Pelikan observes that Augustine created the just war theory reluctantly, and that such wars were made necessary by human wrongdoing (*Jesus through the Centuries*, New Haven: Yale U.P., 1985, p.171).

2

Given that "the just war theory" offers a coherent criteria for moral decision-making to resort to violence, and it means, at least within Christian circles, the proposition that it is not sinful for Christians to engage in warfare under certain circumstances, it has never been mentioned without some allusion to Augustine. This is the main reason why Augustine has been regarded as the founder of the just war theory. Nevertheless, his real intention is still subject to many, and often contradictory, interpretations. For example, Paul Ramsey, a representative of the Protestant just war theorist, says that Augustine "was the first great formulator of the theory that war might be 'just', which thereafter has mainly directed the course of Western thinking about the problem of war" (*War and the Christian Conscience: How shall Modern War be conducted justly?* Durham, NC: Duke U.P., 1961, p.15). Not a few scholars have agreed with him (see the list by Stevenson Jr, p.2), while a few have gone further, to ascribe to Augustine a systematic theory.

Ramsey concedes the open-ended character of Augustine's original thought, and claims that the basis of Augustinian *justum bellum* was not natural justice but the Christian idea of love, attacking later scholastic natural law formulations which sought place on more solid ground. According to Ramsey, Augustine sought a norm of charity that requires the possible; Even in the conduct of war, this love distills itself into a principle of non-combatant immunity, which consists of *Jus in bello* mentioned above as (B)(7).

On the other hand, Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), a modern leading theologian, refuses to derive from Augustine's writings any "Christian realism" including the just war theory, as both inappropriate and misleading temptation (*Christian Realism and Political Problems*, NY, 1953, p.2). He insists the human condition to be an insoluble paradox which no systematic theory could adequately incorporate. Augustine instead confronted the huge enigma of human existence.

Augustine indeed wrote no systematic treatise on war but only brief and scattered statements, which were with few exceptions occasional pieces; they were specific answers to specific questions of his spiritual clients and friends, answers that "often lacked clear grounding in a larger framework of his thought" (Stevenson Jr, p.6). Moreover, his numerous and extensive writings make it difficult to investigate the corpus as a whole. Isidore of Seville once wrote that if anyone told you he had read all the works of Augustine, he was a liar. D.A. Lenihan,

however, compiles usefully eight major statements of the just war theory in the corpus (p.42, with minor correction by the author):

- 1) De libero arbitrio 1.5
- 2) Contra Faustum Manichaeum 22
- 3) Letter 138, to Marcellinus
- 4) Letter 189, to Boniface
- 5) Letter 229, to Darius
- 6) De sermone Domini in monte 302
- 7) Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 6.10
- 8) De civitate Dei

Although the term “just war” appears several times in the corpus of Augustine (Lenihan, p.38), it is still arguable whether his basic concepts, “just”, “war”, “sovereignty”, “intention”, “natural order”, etc. have the same connotations as in modern usage or not. Lenihan concludes that modern just war theory is not on a continuum from Augustine, whose thought is much more complex and that, on the contrary, he is on a continuum with the pacifist tradition of the earlier fathers. On the contrary, Ramsey claims to recognize in the treatises of Augustine the genesis of the idea of non-combatant immunity, which figures prominently in just war theory and the morality of war (chapter 3). Then, let us survey these passages in the above order.

3

(1) Augustine indeed poses the question of whether an enemy may be killed in battle or in self-defense in a criminal situation (De libero arbitrio, 1.5.11-13). In his answer, three classes of would-be killers are distinguished: legionary soldiers, officials such as policemen, and private citizens. The soldier, as an agent of the law, and the officials are, due to their public function, allowed to kill without moral compunction. The private citizen, however, also has a right of legitimate violence; The criminal law gives the wayfarer the right to kill a robber and ravisher to save his own life.

On this basis, J.T. Johnson finds a paradigm case of justifiable Christian killing, which may provide a justification of warfare by extension: “Protecting the wayfarer, the noncombatant, is the only justification for use of force against the assailant. Extrapolating to the case of war, permission is given to Christian to participate in just war...Thus, protection of non-combatancy is the essence of a positive answer to the “original question” whether a Christian may ever take up the sword” (Johnson, p.350). R. Holmes criticizes the two contemporary just war theorists through his scrutiny of the broader context of the passages (On War and Morality, p.123-127). He calls attention to the ambiguous worry about the validity of law in the first sentence of Augustine’s reply, in the form of a dialogue with his friend, Evodius. Augustine made Evodius reply that the law permits the people that it governs to commit lesser wrongs to prevent the commission of greater. For the death of one who lies in wait to kill another is a much slighter thing than that of one who would merely save his own life....Therefore, that law which to preserve the state commands that the violence of an enemy be repelled with like violence, may be obeyed without concupiscence (1.5.12). Augustine has widely been interpreted as exempting from sin any killing carried out by public officials and their agents. This would easily lead to a dualism between personal pacifism as private morality, and justification of violence as public morality. How could Augustine judge the case of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem (1906-62)? Holmes rejects such dualistic view and concludes that Augustine is unwilling to say that even those who kill as “public” persons are blameless in the eyes of God (p.127). First, the reference is clearly only to self-defense, not the defense of others, which Johnson expected. It is undoubtedly misleading to derive any principles of noncombatant immunity from this passage. It is notable that the problem is originally an excursive dialogue within the context of the nature of culpable desire (libido) as the ultimate cause of human evils. In the next paragraph, Evodius confessed his suspicion of the legitimate killing for the purpose of things that can be lost against one’s will. Augustine includes chastity among the things never taken against one’s will. The virtues are, following the Stoic ethics, so deeply seated in the human mind (cardia)

as not to be violently removed. He accepted the distinction between human positive law and "higher unwritten" divine law (1.5.13).

The Stoic idea, which appeared in Sophocles' tragedy *Antigone*, prepared for the later natural law theory. Stressing the inward character of Augustine's view of the human mind and its virtues, Holmes concludes that "even those who kill in their capacity as public officials, or agents thereof, may nonetheless be sinning, and though blameless in the eyes of human law, eventually suffer punishment in the final Judgment" (p.126).

(2) *Contra Faustum manicaeum* (written in ca.400) is a reply to the works of Faustus who criticized the Old Testament in order to undermine the Catholic doctrine. Manichaeism, having a pacifistic aspect, sarcastically and contemptuously criticized the Old Testament for its militarism and the scandalous private lives of legendary figures in the books of the Old Testament. Faustus blames Moses who once killed an Egyptian without divine order (Ex.2.12). In his reply Augustine compares the murder to the violent action of Peter who cut off the right ear of the High Priest's officer (Jn.18.10). However evil in both cases, Augustine does not necessarily consider such violence totally objectionable in itself. He focuses rather on their motivations of violence:

"The Lord, indeed, had told His disciples to carry a sword; but He did not tell them to use it. But that after this sin Peter should become a pastor of the Church was no more improper than that Moses, after smiting the Egyptian, should become the leader of the congregation. In both cases there was resentment against injury, accompanied in one case by love for a brother, and in other by love, though still carnal, of God" (22.70, transl. by R. Stothert, NPNF, 4). He stresses the obedience to one's duty based on the natural order seeking peace rather than the private pacifist sentiment: "The natural order which seeks the peace of mankind, ordains that the monarch should have the power of undertaking war if he thinks it advisable, and that the soldiers should perform their military duties on behalf of the peace and safety of the community" (22.75).

Further, in reply to Faustus' pacifist argument from the Sermon on the Mount, Augustine interprets the admonition, "Do not resist evil" (Mt.5.39) as an interior directive, not as an external commandment: "What is required here is not a bodily action, but an inward position. The sacred seat of virtue is the heart, and such were the hearts of our fathers, the righteous men of old" (22.76).

(3) This motif appears again in his Letter 138 addressed to Marcellinus, a Christian Roman imperial commissioner, who sought spiritual advice from Augustine concerning the relation of Church and state. Lenihan suggests the question would be just as relevant today to the individual Christian faced with the moral dilemma of following his conscience in a secular society (p.46).

What troubles Marcellinus comes from the nonresistance doctrine in the Sermon on the Mount. Augustine, showing his interiorized interpretation of the precept of Jesus, finds no objection to Christian military service in the Scriptures. If the Lord intended to forbid participation in the military, He would have said so clearly. When soldiers approached John the Baptist to ask to be saved, they should have been told to throw down their arms and give up military service entirely. But his response to them was "Do violence to no man, neither calumniate any man, and be content with your pay (Lk.3.14)." Augustine, however, kept silence on the meaning of "do violence to no man", supposing no discrepancy between the precept and the military service.

(4) Besides them above, Augustine sent two letters to the Roman Counts who were asking for his spiritual advice on their military duties. One is the letter 189 to Boniface, a career general of the Roman army, in which he finds no serious problem with Christian engagement in the military profession. He clearly says, "Do not imagine that no one can please God while he is engaged military service" (189.4).

He certifies his position by referring to the Scriptural testimonies of King David, the centurion (Mt. 8.5-13), General Cornelius (Acts. 10.4). He then recommends Boniface, on the ground

of the Lord' Sermon on the Mount, to be a peacemaker even while at war, because peace is the purpose of war, which is legitimate only while it has the legitimate end of securing peace.

(5) The other is the letter 229 to Count Darius written in 429 A.D., one year before his death, in which he repeats his condonation of Christian military service. However, he insists on the excellence and superiority of peace: "Peace is won for the state as well for the provinces, restored to order. But it is a greater glory to destroy war with a word than men with a sword, and to secure and maintain peace by means of peace rather than by war" (229.2). Both letters, originally written to his private intimates, could be also addressed to all the Christian soldiers and officers in the Roman Empire.

(6) Augustine restates his insight of the divine condonation of military service, with a verbal witticism, in his Sermon 302, which was given on the feast of the martyr St. Lawrence: "It is malice (*malitia*) and not military service (*militia*) which keeps soldiers (*milites*) from being good. If you are in the military, I don't want to you leave the military. Nor do I want to be a soldier who would oppress the poor" (302.16, transl. by Lenihan, n.46, p.67).

On the other side, he stresses on the interior peace of one's own heart: "We would wish that soldiers would hear what Christ taught. This message is for all of us; we all should hear it, and if we all listened to it, we would live harmoniously in peace" (302.17, transl. by Lenihan, n.47, p.67, partly emended by the author). Complete peace will come only when we bring about an interior change by listening to the words of the Gospel.

(7) The above mentioned are the testimonies for his, maybe reluctant, permission for inevitable offices. On the other side, he did provide a more positive justification of warfare in Questions concerning the Heptateuch. In his commentary on the narrative of Israelite military occupation of Canaan (Joshua 8.3), Augustine goes further into the question whether ambushes or insidious and deceitful tactics may be used. "It does not matter to justice whether the fighting be open or by devious tactics, in case the war is just" (6.10, CSEL p.428). The end seems to justify the means. He continues: "War is justified when a people or a city neglected either to punish wrongs done by its members or to restore what it had unjustly seized". This statement seems, on its surface, to be an echo of Cicero's view; however, it leads to diverse interpretations. 'Justa bella ulciscuntur iniurias', just wars avenge injuries, became the single important statement of the later medieval political theories (Russell, p.18).

"Another kind of war which could be called just without any doubt (*genus belli sine dubitatione justum est*) is that which is undertaken on the command of God, in whom there can be no injustice and who knows what is right. In this last kind of war the general who leads the army or the people themselves are much less the authors of the war than the instruments of the plan of God" (transl. Lenihan, n.41, p.66).

Russell says that the earlier Christian writers had avoided confronting the question of whether God ever ordained wars Himself, but here Augustine saw God as the author of the war and Joshua as His loyal minister of justice (p.20). Augustine's just war did not attempt to distinguish between offensive and defensive warfare. Defense of the patria, its citizens, and property might be a just cause for war, just as was the refusal of the Amorites to grant the Israelites the right of innocent passage (Nu.21.21-25). He praised also the attitude of Abraham who had tried to kill his son, because of his obedience to the divine order (Gn.22.12).

Holmes gives a visual chart of the complex justification of warfare (St. Augustine and the Just War Theory, p.333). Just wars can be divided into three classes:

- (1) If commanded by God himself, truly just;
- (2) even if not commanded by God, (a) in case equipped with legitimate authority, just cause, materially right intention, and right love, the war can be truly just, while (b) only with legitimate authority and just cause, temporally just. The division is more sharp between (a) and (b) than between (1) and (2). How to act only according to temporal justice was a more important problem for Augustine.

If Russell's diagnosis were right, Augustine would have had even a positive idea of holy war, going beyond the just war, on the basis of the theocratic interpretation here. It had been a crucial dilemma for earlier Christian Fathers to reconcile the military sanction of the Old Testament with the rejection of violence of the New Testament. Augustine never denied the possibility of just wars in the past salvation history. However, it is important to notice that these passages which seem to support the just war are all in the context of his interpretation of the Old Testament. His theological gaze is, so to speak, retrospective, not prospective like that of the later dogmatic Crusaders.

4

(8) The last, but by no means least, text from which one can derive an Augustinian view of war is the City of God. The city of Rome had fallen to Gothic invaders in the 5th century A.D. Against the criticism that the Christianization of the Empire had been the main cause of the collapse of Rome, Augustine undertook a defense of Christianity to demonstrate its positive role in Roman history. However, his reply to the question, what caused the fall of the Roman Empire, goes far beyond a political apology and a historical analysis of the particular state.

The rise and fall of the Roman Empire must be viewed as minor episodes in the larger history of the city of earth, *civitas terrena* (G. Laverre, p.136). The various forms of the immorality including militarism are merely surface indications of deeper human misery: the domination of sinful desire (*libido*).

He says that "The City of Man, for all the width of its expansion through out the world and for all the depth of its differences in this place and that, is a single community. The simple truth is that the bond of a common nature makes all human beings one. Nevertheless, each individual in this community is driven by his passions to pursue his private purposes. Unfortunately the objects of these purposes are such that no one person (let alone, the world community) can ever be wholly satisfied. The reason for this is that nothing but Absolute Being can satisfy human nature. The result is that the City of Man remains in a chronic condition of civil war" (The City of God, XVIII.2, transl. in FC, 1952). Any secular state becomes unjust, in case it cannot represent the common good of those whom it governs. Such political regimes are, according to him, comparable to unlawful bands of robbers (IV.4). "This is the reason why, for all the differences of the many and very great nations throughout the world in religion and morals, language, weapons, and dress, there exist no more than the two kinds of society, which, according to our Scriptures, we have rightly called the two cities.

One city is that of men who live according to the Flesh. The other is of men who live according to the Spirit. Each of them chooses its own kind of peace and, when they attain what they desire, each lives in the peace of its own choosing" (XIV.1). Both the two cities, divided on moral grounds, actually co-exist invisibly within the same political and geographical limits. The two cities have their respective origins from the legendary brothers, Cain, who loved this world and built a visible city (Gn.4.17), and Abel, who built no city to be a pilgrim and stranger in this world (XV.1). The citizens of the two cities behave according to their own idea of peace, which is determined by what they truly love, as distinct from what one might claim to love. Augustine assigns an indispensable role for human beings to the secular states, while distinguishing the artificial character of state from the natural human community, beginning with the family. Secular states are, according to him, at best necessary evils for self-centered human beings to protect themselves.

"Nevertheless, it is wrong to deny that the aims of human civilization are good, for this is the highest end that mankind of itself can achieve. For however lowly the goods of earth, the aim, such as it is, is peace. The purpose even of war is peace" (XV.4).

Augustine insists on the order in human society, because it is essential for peace and the alternative to any political control is only a state of confused anarchy (Letter 153). He approves of the political authorities, following to Paul (Rm.13.1-7), and recommends his audience to be obedient to the sovereign, while political power is in any case nothing but the result of sin. He laments the fact that the war is a part of our existence: "Sinful man hates the

equality of all men under God and, as though he were God, loves to impose his sovereignty on his fellow men. He hates the peace of God which is just and prefers his own peace which is unjust. However, he is powerless not to love peace of some sort. For no man's sin is so unnatural as to wipe out all traces whatsoever of human nature. Anyone, then, who is rational enough to prefer right to wrong and order to disorder, can see that the kind of peace that is based on injustice, as compared with that which is based on justice, does not deserve the name of peace" (XIX.12).

A secular state cannot restore the original unity and perfection of the human race at all, nor should it attempt to do so. This is rather the work of redemptive grace and personal conversion. Nor can the state make men good, or even just, since it lacks a proper conception of the universal human good which is the basis for justice (XVI.1). Laverne concludes that according to the political realism of Augustine "What the state can do to a certain extent, and should do as far as possible, is to mediate the endless disputes of confused and contentious men through the appropriate use of its coercive power" (p.144).

D.A. Lenihan develops his revisionism which regards Augustine as in continuity with the earlier pacifist tradition rather than the spiritual source of later medieval militarism after the Crusaders (p.52-58). While bellum "war" can mean both civil and foreign war, in his age virtually all wars had an aspect of civil war within the Roman Empire. The last great foreign conquest was Valerian's invasion of Mesopotamia (260 A.D.) almost a century before Augustine. The Vandals, who would capture his city, Hippo, just after his death, were not foreign but rather part and parcel of the Empire. Even the notorious sack of Rome of the Visigoths in 410 A.D. was not an invasion by foreign barbarians at all but a migration of those who had been settled within the Empire for over a generation and Christianized. The Vandals and the Visigoths should be discriminated from the Huns under Attila. Augustine had in mind the idea of war primarily as a civil conflict or police action to maintain social order in the Empire. Lenihan stresses that Augustine was referring to internal police actions and not external adventures, when he condoned the "wars" of Boniface, praised the activities of Darius, and advised Marcellinus on the acceptability of military service (p.53).

Secondly, Augustine has a duality of justice, legal and divine, which corresponds to the two Cities of God and Man. The legal justice is caused by fear, while the divine justice comes from Grace (De gratia Christi, 13.14). An action in conformity with law is a necessary but never sufficient condition for the true justice. Lenihan argues that this ambiguous notion of Augustinian justice was replaced by Thomas Aquinas with the concept of natural justice, which has always and everywhere the same force of inducing towards the good and restraining from evil (p.55). Anscombe, as an absolutist based on Catholicism, once described its force as never dependent on its promulgation as part of positive law, written down, agreed upon, and adhered to by the parties concerned (p.64).

Revisionists of Augustine's militarism (e.g. Lenihan, Stevenson Jr, and Holmes) all emphasize the interiority of his moral philosophy. Whether an action is just or not is, for Augustine, a subjective question dependent on the agent's real motivation. He says: "What is the evil in war? Is it the death of someone who will soon die in any case, that other may live in peaceful subjection? This is merely cowardly dislike, not any religious feeling. The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like; and it is generally to punish these things, when force is required to inflict the punishment, that, in obedience to God or some lawful authority, good men undertake wars" (Contra Faustum, 22.74).

In the immense corpus of his writings we can find no trace of the simple glorification of war such as there is Cicero and other Latin writers. The only ground for love's inflicting pain, or even death, upon another, would be for the other person's sake, which Augustine may justify. Punishment, to be the right intention of warfare, can only be inflicted to chasten the unjust offender. On the principle of Christian charity, it is only what the offender does that one may hate, not the person himself. However, one can self-consciously act with his altruistic intention, being indeed motivated by his own, almost always unconsciously, sinful desire: revengeful cruelty.

Holmes, based on his subtle analysis of the different connotation between motivation and intention, regards the interiority of Augustine's love-centered ethics as rooted in motivation not in intention (p.326), and then suggests that what later Christians seem to have given insufficient attention to is the Augustinian skepticism regarding our ability to certify love as a motive for our own conduct (p.337). Can we, including the modern just war theorists, share his radical skepticism, not pacifist sentiment, when we are faced with a violent situation?

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